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Democracy' and the
Organization of American
States
One need only cast an occasional glance at a newspaper
to realize that the South American countries comprise
what is often referred to as a "political hotbed." In the
center of this hotbed is the OAS, the Organization of
American States. Born of discord, the Preamble of its
charter declares that its members are "confident that the
true significance of Americin solidarity and good neigh-
borliness can only mean the consolidation on this con-
tinent, within the framework of democratic institutions,
of a system of individual liberty and social justice based
on respect for the essential rights of man .... " Professor
Thomas, who served with the U.S. Foreign Service as an
American Vice-Consul, together with Mrs. Thomas, pre-
sent analysis of that organization and its ramifications on
democracy in the member states. This analysis includes
a discussion of the legal force of the OAS Charter and
other member state agreements. A most serious dilemma
faced by the OAS is the conflict between the philosophy
of democracy and the principle of non-intervention. The
Thomas' conclude that it is time for the OAS to honor
its mandate in furtherance of the principles on which
the organization was founded.
A. J. Thomas, Jr.*
Ann Van Wynen Thomas**
INTRODUCTION
The crisis in western civilization manifested by wars and revolu-
tions has made our century one of the most turbulent in the long
and unending struggle between democracy and authoritarianism.
With the explosion of scientific and technical progress has come,
* Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University School of Law.
** Research Associate, Southwestern Legal Foundation.
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hand in hand, a perfection of the leviathan state far beyond any
Machiavellian dream. On the one side the democrats proclaim
that the life, the mind, the heart and the soul of each individual
is important for itself and that any economic system, socialist or
private, is tested by its usefulness in preserving and liberating the
individual. On the other side, totalitarianism, whether it be of the
extreme right or the extreme left, proclaims that the highest de-
velopment of civilization is the state; that this alone is important;
and that all individual development is tested by its utility in pro-
moting the interest of the state. Between these two philosophies,
one maintaining the value of the individual and his development
and the other proclaiming the value of the state to which every-
thing must be sacrificed, there is an unbridgeable abyss.
In recent years the tempo of the struggle has quickened in the
Western Hemisphere to such an extent as to threaten the very sol-
idarity of the American community of nations. From the begin-
ning of the inter-American movement,1 democracy was proclaim-
ed as a common denominator among North America, Central
America and South America, although admittedly many nations of
the hemisphere have often had periods of dictatorships. The inter-
American system slowly developed over the years on the premise
that all the members thereof maintained at least an ideological fi-
delity to the ethical conceptions of democratic society in spite of
widely different physical conditions, differences of religion, of so-
cial background, of economic interest, of cultural background.
But the forces which have led a great number of Europeans and
Asians to accept the disciplined submission to the authoritarian
state as an escape from the responsibilities and isolation of freedom
have continued their work in the nations of the Americas. And
again there has been cast over the hemisphere the dark shadow of
the establishment in the Americas of a non-American totalitarian
government-international communism. With it has come a seri-
ous challenge to the stated fundamental values of the inter-Ameri-
can system, a corrosion of mutual trust, and a threat to the stability
of the Organization of American States (OAS).
That such a situation has come about may seem an anomaly
1. On the beginnings of Pan America and its historical antecedents see
BEMIS, THE LATIN AMERICAN POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES chs. II-VI
(1943); GIL, EVOLUCION DEL PANAMERICANISMO 19-37 (1933); LOCKEY,
PAN-AMERICANISM, ITS BEGINNINGS (1920); SANCHEZ Y SANCHEZ, CURSO
DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PUBLiCO AMERICANO 167-81 (1943); WHIT-
AKER, THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE IDEA: ITS RISE AND DECLINE cbs. I & II
(1954); YPES, EL PANAMERICANISMO Y EL DERECHO INTERNACIONAL 3-62
(1930); Alvarez, Latin America and International Law, 3 AM. J. INT'L L.
269 (1909).
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when one considers that ever since the Wars of Independence, the
republican form of government and the democratic political ideal
have been proclaimed for each of the nations of the Americas.2
This is true to such an extent that the people of the Western Hemis-
phere are firm in the belief that this area of the world is the hemis-
phere of freedom. They have adopted similar internal democratic
constitutions, and their political leaders, even the most dictatorial
and absolutist, have all worked against a background where the
democratic ideals are persistently repeated. Their diplomats have
signed international treaties extolling democratic republican insti-
tutions and proclaiming that the defense of democracy is a guid-
ing principle for the American family of nations. With this history
it might then be supposed that democracy has not only become a
form of government and a way of life within the confines of each
national boundary, but has also developed into a legal norm of the
inter-American system binding each of the American republics.
If this were true, it would follow that any American nation which
departed from the principles of democracy would be committing
not only a violation of its own internal constitutional norm, but at
the same time would be breaching international law and in so do-
ing could invite upon itself sanctions from the other members of
the hemispheric community to uphold the law. 3
Before it can be determined whether or not inter-American com-
mitments which have solemnly proclaimed the existence of a "com-
mon democracy throughout the Americas" have developed into en-
forceable legal norms, there must be an examination of the funda-
mental meaning of democracy, for democracy is one of the magic
words of the twentieth century with a ,ide range of different uses
in different parts of the world.' Because of its misuse and distortion
by communist nations, the term can be used in international life
2. For example, all of the American republics have adopted a constitu-
tional structure similar to that of the United States which embodies a re-
publican-democratic form of government. See FITZGIBBON, THE CONSTITU-
TIONS OF THE AMERICAS (1948). An excellent article by Jaffin, New World
Constitutional Harmony: A Pan-Ameri-canadian Panorama, 42 COLUM.
L. REV. 523 (1942), traces and explains American constitutional ideology.
See WmTAKER, op. cit. supra note 1, at 1-21, for a discussion of the early
ideological background of the hemispheric movement. Many Latin Ameri-
can jurists proclaim democracy and liberty as a unifying force in the
Americas and as bases of inter-American solidarity. See, e.g., YPES, op. Cit.
supra note 1, at 432; Alvarez, Le Developpement du Droit des Gens Dans
le Nouveau-Monde, XXV TRANSAcT. GRoT. Soc'y 169 (1939).
3. See KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 18-23 (1952), and
Kunz, Sanctions in International Law, 54 AM. J. INT'L L. 324 (1960),
for a discussion of international delicts and sanctions therefor.
4. QUINTANMLA, A LATIN AMERiCAN SPEAKS 219-36 (1943); THOMAS,
COMMUNISM VERSUS INTERNATIONAL LAW 51-55 (1953).
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with only the utmost caution. Yet democracy in the western sense
cannot be precisely defined because democracy is neither a system
nor a set of institutions nor a code of law nor a combination of
policies. Rather, it is a belief in human nature and a code of be-
havior which translates that belief into thought and action.
To say that the classical western concept of democracy cannot
be precisely defined does not mean that one cannot delineate its
central theme nor its primary elements. Western democracy has a
central theme relating to form, content and aspirations. First and
foremost it is a designation of a certain form of government, that
is, of the manner in which a state is organized. In this sense de-
mocracy is a legal and formal concept. It indicates how political
decisions are made, not what these decisions are in substance. It
designates a method for the establishment of the political will, not
its object, end or means. Political democracy is a form of govern-
ment by persons who are freely chosen by, and responsible to,
the governed. The population as a whole must be able to exercise
a choice as to who is to govern them under minimum conditions of
pressure and force, and even more vital, they must have the oppor-
tunity of peacefully revising or reversing their choice.5 Western
political democracy rests upon the right of a people to make their
own mistakes, plus the opportunity to correct those mistakes.
The tale of democracy does not end with political democracy.
In the words of Quincy Wright:
Democracy is a theory, policy, procedure, and art, emphasizing human
welfare, individual freedom, popular participation, and general toler-
ance. It can adapt itself to many conditions, but it thrives in an
atmosphere of education, toleration, peace, and prosperity. Ignorance,
dogma, war, and poverty are its enemies. They breed absolute and
arbitrary government, uncritical and lethargic people, which are the
reverse of democracy.6
Thus the overtones of democracy are ethical in nature, con-
cerning that interrelated complex of ideas which centers around
the notions of right and wrong, justice and humanity, liberty and
peace. These ethical aspirations of democracy are attitudes or ways
of life which appear not only in the political sphere, not only in
public life, but also in the realm of economics, in family life, com-
munity life, social relations, and in international affairs. In other
words, in all contacts between man and man. Democracy must in-
5. FORSTER, Two CHEERS FOR DEMOCRACY 69 (1951); MAYO, DE-
MOCRACY AND MARXISM 254-60 (1955); PADrLLA, FREE MEN OF
AMERICA 68-78 (1943).
6. UNESCO, DEMOCRACY IN A WORLD OF TENSIONS 446 (McKeon ed.
1951).
[Vol. 46:337
clude these ethical aspirations even though they are dimly grasped
and at best imperfectly realized. For whenever these ethical ele-
ments are repudiated, there is no authority to limit the power of
the state, the political and economic liberty of the citizen is lost,
human dignity vanishes, mutual fears replace mutual confidence as
the basis of all human contacts, and, in the international sphere,
power politics-naked and avowed-takes the place of the rule of
law.
These then are the form, content and aspirations of democracy.
They blend and merge confusingly one into the other in the his-
torical evolution of western democracy and have become insepar-
ably connected in men's minds. While democracy does not
evolve in precisely the same manner in any two countries, for each
people has its characteristic institutions and traditions and each
epoch its peculiar problems, nonetheless, in the twentieth century,
no nation can claim it is a democracy in the western or classical
sense of the word unless it contains at least some rudimentary ele-
ments of political democracy. It must also have some understand-
ing of the humanistic goals of democracy which can be called
human rights and fundamental freedoms. The double aspect of
democracy-popular constitutional government plus human rights
and fundamental freedoms-are therefore complementary aspects
of how political communities seek to resolve the problems of pow-
er, welfare, freedom and creativeness. They are parts of each other;
each fruitless unless set in the context of the other.
I. POLITICAL DEMOCRACY
The American republics, from their inception as separate na-
tions, have proclaimed that their governments were dedicated to
the theories and practices of political democracy. This common
democratic ideal, even if not always practiced, has been the foun-
dation on which the new world community was slowly but patient-
ly constructed. The Monroe Doctrine was decreed in part because
of North America's opposition to any intervention by the Holy Al-
liance to re-establish divine-right dynasties at the expense of the
hard won battles fought to establish republican, democratic gov-
ernments in Latin America.7 Three years later the Latin Ameri-
7. "It is impossible that the allied powers should extend their political
system to any portion of either continent without endangering our peace
and happiness; nor can one believe that our southern brethren, if left to
themselves, would adopt it of their own accord. It is equally impossible,
therefore, that we should behold such interposition, in any form, with
indifference." Monroe Doctrine as set forth in VI MOORE, A DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 401 (1906). For a summary of the background of
1961] OAS
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cans, meeting in the Congress of Panama of 1826,1 reaffirmed
Monroe's stand and, under the inspiration of Bolivar, attempted
to secure the goals of political democracy throughout the hemis-
phere by drawing up the Treaty of Union, League and Perpetual
Confederation. Included in the Treaty was a provision for expul-
sion from the proposed federation of any state which deserted the
democratic form of government.9 This treaty failed to become ef-
fective for lack of ratification by the signatory nations,10 but it
stands as an unfailing monument to Bolivar's farsighted political
percipience.
Through the years that followed, however, the principle of po-
litical democracy as a cornerstone of the Pan American movement
received scant attention. The leaders of the nations showed little
enthusiasm for establishing a legal norm for the community which
would obligate the members to maintain internal political democ-
racy or for a system of sanctions which could be directed against
any state departing from a democratic form of government. The
majority of Latin American writers and statesmen, while voicing
their basic and common devotion to political democracy, were far
more vociferous in proclaiming that no nation or group of na-
tions had the legal right to interfere in the domestic or internal af-
fairs of another state. This principle of non-intervention was giv-
en far higher precedence than the goal of political democracy.
They emphasized a basic tenet of international law-the right of
independence. That is, a state must be free to manage its internal
affairs as it sees fit without interference from other states except
to the extent that it is bound by international law. A state thereby
is free to choose any form of government or political institutions
it desires. As a corollary of this right of independence other states
are subjected by international law to a duty of non-intervention in
the internal affairs of another state, and consequently any inter-
vention to hinder or prevent a state from exercising its right to
the Monroe Doctrine, see THOMAS & THOMAS, NON-INTERVENTION-THE
LAW AND ITS IMPORT IN THE AMERICAS 10-14 (1956).
8. Accounts and summaries of the Congress of Panama may be found
in I ANTOKOLETZ, DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PUBLico 341-42 (1938);
BEMIS, JOHN QUINCY ADAMS AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN
FOREIGN POLICY 543-65 (1949); Collings, The Congress of Bolivar, 6 His-
PANIC AMERICAN HISTORICAL REV. 194 (1926).
9. Treaty of Perpetual Union, League and Confederation between the
Republics of Colombia, Central America, Peru and the United Mexican
States, July 15, 1826, art. 29. CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL
PEACE, INTERNATIONAL CoNFERENCES OF AMERICAN STATES 1889-1928,
xxiv, xxix (1931).
10. Only Gran Colombia ratified the treaty, and it did so with reser-
vation.
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choose its own government, even by means of a violent revolution
and even though the government which emerges is totalitarian, is
an illicit act under rules of international law."
This doctrine of the right of a people to establish any form of
government they desired made great strides about the time of the
French Revolution. That was a time of optimism when liberalists
assumed unquestioningly that democratic constitutionalism would
in due course become the paramount form of government every-
where, and that logically the ultimate beneficiaries of a doctrine of
non-intervention in the internal form of government would be the
people of a state asserting their natural rights against oppressive
rulers. 2 Consequently, Kant, who has been called the father of
the doctrine of non-intervention, laid down the prohibition against
intervention in absolute terms, yet qualified it by his statement
that the civil constitution in every state shall be republican.3 To
Kant, the purpose of international law was to maintain world
peace, and he felt that world peace would be maintained only if
and when the republican form of government had become uni-
versal. Accordingly, Kant's concept of international law was based
upon a community of nations having similar political ideas and
hopes. His prohibition against intervention was absolute only as
to the members of that community of nations, and was not relevant
to nations which did not accept certain principles of behavior
fortified by agreement upon some fundamental values and be-
liefs.' 4
The late nineteenth century and early twentieth century saw a
shift away from ethical values as part of the concept of the com-
munity of nations, and the geographical ambit of international law
was extended to all states,'" whatever their internal form of gov-
11. The attitude of Latin America to non-intervention and the reasons
therefor are contained in THoMAs & THOMAS, op. cit. supra note 7, at
chs. II & III.
12. Id. at 7.
13. HERSHEY, ESSENTIALS OP INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC LAW AND ORGANI-
ZATION 243 n.18 (1927), claims that the principle of non-intervention ap-
pears to have first been put forth by KANT, ESSAY ON PERPETUAL PEACE
(1795). Hershey fails, however, to mention the fact that Kant's seemingly
absolute prohibition of intervention and his stand for unfettered internal
sovereignty might be considered as modified by his statement that the
civil constitution in every state should be republican.
14. For a statement of Kant's thesis, see LOEWENSTEIN, POLITICAL RE-
CONSTRUCTION 17-20 (1946).
15. Hall asserts the principle as follows: "Thus a state may place itself
under any form of government that it wishes, and may frame its social
institutions upon any model. To foreign states the political or social doc-
trines which may be exemplified in it . . . are legally immaterial." HALL,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 43-44 (6th ed. 1909).
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emnment, This resulted in modifying Kant's original thesis, leaving
nothing but the absolute imperative-that the internal form of
government of any state was unimportant to the world community
or to the peace of the world and therefore no right of intervention
in any internal form of government existed.
Because of historical circumstances, Latin America has been
subjected to many interventions by the United States, European
nations, and neighboring Latin American states. 6 Consequently
it is not surprising to find that their statesmen and jurists, for the
most part, firmly uphold the principle of non-intervention in do-
mestic affairs; they are not content to rely upon general interna-
tional legal principles, but rather codify these rules into multilateral
treaties which govern all the nations of the Americas.' Despite
this insistence on intransigent non-intervention, a vociferous min-
ority has always kept alive the issue of democracy as it relates to
the American community, claiming that where political democracy
and human rights and freedoms are denied, a nation has no right
to feel that the sacred curtain of national sovereignty should be
permitted to act as a shield for domestic policy from outside in-
terference. In 1837, for example, Pedro Felix Vicuna of Chile
published a widely read pamphlet urging the establishment of an
international organization, which he called the General Congress of
America, in which he sought to vest the power to support popular
revolutions against tyrannical governments.' 8 In 1844, Juan Bau-
tista Alberdi, while a refugee in Chile from the tyranny of the
Argentine dictatorship of Rosas, maintained that intervention
should be used to promote democratic governments in the Ameri-
can states.'9 In December, 1847, at the Congress of Lima, a Bo-
livian proposal that collective intervention should be used as a
method of establishing and supporting constitutional governments
was thoroughly discussed, but was finally rejected."
In 1907 an Ecuadorian diplomat, Carlos R. Tobar, advocated
the adoption of the legal rule that the American republics should
16. See citations in note 11 supra.
17. CONVENTION ON RIGHTS AND DUTrEs oF STATES, SEVENTH INTER-
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF AMERICAN STATES, INTERNATIONAL CONFER-
ENCES OF AMERICAN STATES FIRST SuPP., art. 8, 1933-1940, 121-23
(1940); ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL RELATIVE TO NON-INTERVENTION, INTER-
AMERICAN CONFERENCE FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE, art. 1 Id. at
191-92; ART. 15, CHARTER OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES
as set forth in U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 3263, NINTH INTERNA-
TIONAL CONFERENCE OF AMERICAN STATES 169-70 (1948).
18. 'BuRR & HussEy, I DOCUMENTS ON INTER-AMERICAN COOPERATION,
1810-1881, Doc. No. 20 (1955).
19. Id., Doc. No. 24.
20. I ULLOA, CONGRESO AMERICANO DE LIMA clxx (1938).
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not grant recognition to governments which came into power by
revolutions contrary to the constitution of a state.21 He felt that by
using non-recognition as a sanction in this manner, greater respect
for constitutional order and political democracy would follow nat-
urally. While a majority of the nations viewed this doctrine with
some scepticism, the Central American republics decided to experi-
ment with it. Thus, they incorporated the Tobar Doctrine, with
some clarification and addition, into two treaties. It was agreed by
these nations that none of the signatories would recognize a gov-
ernment coming to power as a result of a coup d'etat or revolu-
tion "so long as the freely elected representatives of the people
thereof, have not constitutionally reorganized the country."22
Moreover it was agreed that even after subsequent legitimation by
the will of the people substantially declared, the states would not
grant recognition if the government was to continue to be headed
by leaders of the revolution or made up of them.
Here was the first attempt in the Americas to create by treaty
an international law norm supporting political democracy and
sanctioning through collective non-recognition a state having a rev-
olutionary government which refused to hold democratic elections.
Although the United States was not a party to these treaties, it
followed the principles laid down therein for granting or with-
holding recognition in relation to the signatories thereof until the
treaties were repudiated by the Central American nations.3
In 1914 President Wilson attempted to bring into being a mul-
tilateral treaty guarantee of democracy by all the American na-
tions. While his proposed Pan American Pact was concerned pri-
marily with the establishment of a system of hemispheric collective
security, it also sought to secure representative democracy through-
out the hemisphere. The first article of the pact provided that "the
high contracting parties . . . hereby join one another in a com-
mon and mutual guarantee of territorial integrity and of political
independence under republican form of government." In other
words, if an American state departed from the republican form of
government, it would apparently be excluded from the mutual
21. ANDERSON, EL GoBIERNo DE FACTO 26 (1925); Garcia, Estudios
sobre la Doctrina Tobar, 20 TRABAJOS DEL CUARTO CONGRESO CIENTIFICO
(10 PAN-AMERICANO) CELEBRADO EN SANTIAGO DE CHILE DEL 25 DE
DICIEMBRE DE 1908 AL 5 DE ENERO 1909, 326-29 (1912); Stowell, The
Doctrine of Constitutional Legitimacy, 25 AM. J. INT'L L. 302 (1931).
22. Additional Treaty to the Treaty of Peace 1907, II MALLOY, TREATIES,
CONVENTIONS, INTERNATIONAL ACTS, PROTOCOLS & AGREEMENTS, 2397
(1910). General Treaty of Peace and Amity 1923, 17 AM. J. INT'L L.
Supp. 117 (1923).
23. THOMAS & THoMAs, op. cit. supra note 7, at 248-49.
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guarantee of territorial integrity or political independence. This
Pact died in the proposal stage. The Latin American statesmen
who were sounded out as to its feasibility were hesitant to en-
dorse it.2
It was not until there began to occur a rapid spread of totali-
tarianism, both of the right and of the left, after World War I,
that the inter-American system began to concern itself seriously
with the principles of political democracy. By 1936, threats of
world conquest emanating from fascist and communist dictator-
ships were having repercussions in the Western Hemisphere. At
the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace which
met at Buenos Aires in 1936, the nations of the Americas signed
a declaration which stressed "the existence of a common democ-
racy throughout America" as a basis of inter-American solidarity
and cooperation. The conferences and meetings held during and
following World War II contained scattered references to democ-
racy in their final acts, most of them as resolutions or recommen-
dations to the governments to prevent the spread of subversive doc-
trines and activities inimical to democracy in the continent.2" None
of these resolutions or recommendations were imperatively worded
to permit them to be interpreted as laying down a legal norm bind-
ing upon the member states to maintain a system of political democ-
racy within their national borders.
Nevertheless certain wartime actions taken by the American na-
tions did have a bearing upon the form of government to be main-
tained in each American state. Although collective non-recognition
of regimes coming to power by revolutionary or unconstitutional
methods had not been adopted as an inter-American rule of law,
the Emergency Advisory Committee for the Political Defense of
the Continent, created in 1942 for the purpose of studying and co-
ordinating measures for preventing subversive activities that might
be harmful to the security of the American republics, brought
again to the fore collective non-recognition of certain governments
-this time on a hemispheric scale. In 1943, a resolution was
adopted recommending to all American governments that for the
duration of the war they should not recognize a new government
constituted by force before consulting with one another in order
24. The terms of the Wilson Pact may be found in II PAPERS RELATING
TO THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE LANSING PAPERS
1914-1920, 495-96 (1940).
25. Resumes of all of these statements and declarations are contained in
PAN AMERICAN UNION, MANUAL OF INTER-AMERICAN RELATIONS, CON-
FERENCES AND ORGANIZATION SERIES No. 26, at 74-80 (1953).
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to determine, among other things, the circumstances which led to
the establishment of a new government.26
In 1943 the government of Bolivia was seized through a coup
d'etat by a revolutionary junta which gave indications of anti-demo-
cratic and pro-fascist leanings. After consultation initiated by the
Emergency Advisory Committee, 19 American States agreed to
withhold recognition. The effect of this collective action forced
Bolivia to purge its government of some of its pro-totalitarian ele-
ments.2" The inter-American system was less successful when it
later applied the same procedure to Argentina.29 This wartime ac-
tion was a definite recognition that the foreign policy of any state
is based upon its internal type of government, and in time of
emergency such as a world war, the form of internal government
of each and every state must become the concern of all of the states
of the inter-American community.
When the war ended, the question of using collective non-rec-
ognition as a sanction against new regimes suspect of being anti-
democratic was aired at the February, 1945 Conference on War
and Peace held in Mexico City. Some American states were vio-
lently opposed to such procedure on the grounds that it again open-
ed wide the door to intervention. These states proposed that the
whole institution of recognition should be abolished and suggested
that whenever a new government was established, either legiti-
mately or by revolution, the pre-existing diplomatic relations
should not be disturbed.3" Those nations which felt that the
American states would continue to evade internal political democ-
racy no matter how strongly they extolled the virtues thereof,
backed a resolution by Guatemala which recommended that the
American republics refrain from "granting recognition to and
maintaining relations with anti-democratic regimes which, in the
future, may establish themselves in any of the countries of the
continent; and in particular with regimes which may result from a
coup d'etat against legitimately established governments of a dem-
ocratic structure." The Guatemalan resolution likewise recom-
mended a special test whereby such regimes could be adjudged,
26. See Spaeth & Sanders, The Emergency Advisory Committee for
Political Defense, 38 AM. J. INT'L L. 218 (1944).
27. INTER-AMERICAN EMERGENCY ADVISORY COMMITTEE FOR POLITICAL
DEFENSE, SECOND ANNUAL REPORT 16 (1944).
28. SMITH, YANKEE DIPLOMACY 94-98 (1953).
29. Fenwick, Intervention: Individual and Collective, 39 AM. J. INT'L L.
645, 660 (1945).
30. See, e.g., a project of convention submitted by Ecuador on the
abolition of the recognition of de facto governments as set forth in PAN
AMERICAN UNION, HANDBOOK FOR DELEGATES TO THE NINTH INTERNA-
TIONAL CONFERENCE OF AMERICAN STATES 87-88 (1947).
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namely thie extent to which the: popular will in a particular country
may have contributed to their establishment according to the free
judgment of each state.3 '
In .proposing the use of the weapon of nonrecognition against
anti-democratic regimes, Guatemala pointed out that such regimes
constituted a serious duanger to the unity, peace and defense of the
continent for it was impossible to expect from such regimes full,
sincere or effective cooperation in the democratic advancement of
Pan Americanism in time 6f peace or war.I Guatemala declared that World War II had created a world-wide
demand that the rights of man should be recognized and protected
on the international level, and that the 'inter-American move-
ment should therefore support this universal yearning by recog-
nizing that anti-democratic regimes were the primary cause of de-
nial of human rights and freedoms.32
The nations attending the Mexico City Conference were not yet
ready to take even such a tentative step toward advancing the inter-
American ideal of political democracy, and neatly sidestepped the
issue by referring the proposal of Guatemala to the Inter-Ameri-
can Juridical Committee for study and consideration, the results
of which were to be reported at the Ninth Conference of American
States in 1948.13 At that time the Inter-American Juridical Com-
mittee declared that its study had shown that the Guatemalan pro-
posal would again subject the American states to intervention in
internal matters, and this would have deplorable consequences;
hence the Juridical Committee could not support the proposal. 4
The Governments which supported the Guatemalan position in
Mexico were not easily brushed aside, and they continued to seek
ways and means of assuring internal democracy in all the nations
of the Americas. In November, 1945, Eduardo Rodriguez Lar-
reta, the Uruguayan Minister of Foreign Affairs, handed a sen-
sational note to the Ambassador of each of the American repub-
lics to Uruguay. 5 In this note he accepted Kant's thesis equating
31. Id. at 88-89.
32. PAN AMERICAN UNION, INTER-AMERICAN JURIDICAL COMMITTEE RE-
PORT AND DRAFT CONVENTION ON RECOGNITION OF DE FACTO
GoVERNMENTs 9 (1950).
33. PAN AMERICAN UNION, RESOLUTION XXXVIII, DEFENSE AND
PRESERVATION OF DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, INTER-AMERICAN CONFERENCE
ON PROBLEMS OF WAR AND PEACE, REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE GOVERNING
BOARD OF THE PAN AMERICAN UNION BY THE DIRECTOR GENERAL 67(Cong. & Conf. Series No. 47, 1945).
34. Fenwick, The Problems of the Recognition of De Facto Governments,
INTER-AMERICAN JURIDICAL YEAR BOOK 18, 33 (1948).
35. PAN AMERICAN UNION, CONSULTATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF
URUGUAY AND REPLIES OF THE GOVERNMENTS ON THE PARALLELISM BE-
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peace with the democratic form of Government, highlighting what
he termed the "parallelism between peace and democracy." Rod-
riguez Larreta listed the numerous resolutions taken at Inter-
American Conferences which affirmed adherence to democratic
ideals and in which the 21 republics had agreed that it was'ad-
visable to protect the integrity of these ideals. He then emphasized
that the need in the Americas was to transform these oft-repeated
principles and standards into realities. Therefore, he suggested that
within the inter-American system there should be established
definite responsibility for collective intervention to assure democ-
racy whenever circumstances require such assurance. Larreta stat-
ed:
Peace is safe only where democratic principles of government pre-
vail. The basic rights of man are part of these principles. Thus, though
once exclusively domestic concerns, they now affect international in-
terests and require international protection. In case of their violation
in any American republic, the community of nations should take col-
lective multilateral action to restore full democracy there. Such action'
is really nothing more than the fulfillment of obligations freely assumed
by the American republics, all of whom have proclaimed at inter-
American conferences their devotion to democracy and the rights of
man.
36
All of the nations replied to the note, eight expressing approval
and thirteen disapproval.17 Those disapproving declared that it
would be difficult to discover' whether a particular government
was democratic, for it might be fulfilling the ideals of democ-
racy in some of its actions but not in others. Furthermore, it was
observed that since democracy in all its aspects was such a utopian
state, it was doubtful if any nation now in existence or ever having
existed had lived' up to all the true ideals encompassed in the term.
Some replies alleged that democracy would of necessity include
"representative democracy," yet a government might come into
power through a revolution and might well represent the desires
and the will of the people of a nation even though not elected dem-
ocratically. On the other hand, it was known in Latin America that
a state had a totalitarian government which denied many of the
liberties conceived to be inherent in a democratic system and
which, nevertheless, came into power by constitutional means and
maintained itself with popular support and democratic elections.
TWEEN DEMOCRACY AND PEACE, THE INTERNATIONAL RIGHTS OF MAN
AND COLLECTIVE ACTION IN DEFENSE OF THOSE PRINCIPLES (May, 1946).
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid. See also QuINTANILLA, PANAMERICANISM AND DEMOCRACY
39-41 (1952); Selte-Camara Filho, A Doutrina Larreta, 3 Boletim da
Sociedade de Direito Intemacional 18 (1946).
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And finally it was alleged that it was impossible to equate de-
mocracy with peace in all instances, for some governments, al-
though democratic in nature, had on occasions constituted a major
threat to the peace.
The fact that the Larreta Doctrine was rejected by the majority
of the American republics is not as important as the fact that over
one third of the republics, even in face of all apparent obstacles,
were willing to accept it as a principle of the international law
governing the Americas. This was a strong indication that in the
Western Hemisphere the quest to make internal democracy an
international legal norm was by no means dead.
At the Ninth International Conference of American States held
in Bogota in 1948, the whole inter-American system was re-
vamped and a basic Charter, known as the Charter of Bogota,
was adopted for the organization. But prior to the adoption of
this instrument, long hours of debate took place over the issue of
the establishment of democratic regimes in the hemisphere. The
Brazilian delegation sought to make membership in the reconsti-
tuted inter-American system conditional not only upon ratification
of the new Charter, but also upon the adoption of a democratic
form of government. Requirements for such a government were
listed as follows: freedom of the ballot, the opportunity or possi-
bility of private enterprise, a government founded upon more
than one political party, and a guarantee of the fundamental rights
of man.3" Although Brazil's stand received some support, it ulti-
mately was rejected.
In spite of an unwillingness to adopt the views of Guatemala
set forth at the Mexico City Conference, or to adopt the doctrine
of Rodriguez Larreta, or the position of Brazil, the Charter of the
Organization of American States39 contained many proclamations
affirming belief in the aims and aspirations of democracy. The
Preamble of the Charter declares that its signatories are:
confident that the true significance of American solidarity and good
neighborliness can only mean the consolidation on this continent,
within the framework of democratic institutions, of a system of individ-
ual liberty and social justice based on respect for the essential rights
of man ....
Article 5 (d) of the Charter "reaffirms" that the "solidarity of the
American States and the high aims which are sought through it
require the political organization of those states on the basis of the
effective exercise of representative democracy."
38. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 3263, op. cit. supra note 17, at 15.
39. The Charter of the OAS may be found in U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB.
No. 3263, id. at 166-86.
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There has been some discussion among international law author-
ities as to the legal effect of a preamble to an international instru-
ment. Some writers declare that it is not a binding portion of the
treaty,4" while other authorities argue that a preamble has the
same legal validity and same binding force as the other sections of
the treaty, and that if it is couched in terms of legal obligation, a
legal obligation arises.41 Whichever stand is accepted as to the
Preamble of the Charter of Bogota, the conclusion arrived at must
be the same. It is of ideological rather than legal significance for
it sets forth certain political ideals without guaranteeing their real-
ization by establishing a legal obligation to behave in a certain
manner. The statement that the signatory nations are confident
that American solidarity means the consolidation in the Americas
of a system of individual liberty and social justice within a frame-
work of democratic institutions does not set forth a basic obliga-
tion of the members of the organization.
What then of Article 5(d) in which the states "reaffirm" that
the solidarity of the Americas requires the political organization
of American states on the basis of representative democracy? Does
the reaffirmation of a requirement have any legal effect at all?
Does it constitute an obligation on the part of each and every
ratifying state to have a government based on representative de-
mocracy? To reaffirm is to affirm again in order to strengthen.
To affirm means to maintain as true. The statement, "we maintain
as true that continental solidarity requires each state to have rep-
resentative democracy" obviously spells out no legal obligations. 42
Such a statement places neither on each state nor on the OAS the
duty to see that this condition is brought about.
These considerations indicate that under the Charter of Bogota
there is no right of collective intervention by the Organization of
American States to secure a democratic form of government in
each of the American republics nor is there an international treaty
duty for each of the republics to establish a democratic form of
government. This interpretation is given added weight in view of
Article 13 of the Charter of Bogota which declares that "each
state has the right to develop its political life freely and naturally,"
that is, according to its nature, without outside interference. As
40. Pollux, The Interpretation of the Charter, 23 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L.
54 (1946).
41. GOODRICH & HAMBRO, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 89 (rev.
ed. 1949).
42. "A legal obligation to behave in a certain way is established if a
sanction is attached to the contrary behavior." KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE
UNITED NATIONS 9 (1950).
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this is couched in terms of a legal right, there would appear to be
a duty of non-interference on the part of the organization.
But the Charter of Bogota is not the sole instrument governing
the inter-American system.43 The Inter American Treaty of Re-
ciprocal Assistance, signed at Rio in 1947 and ratified by all of
the American States is also an integral part of the OAS.44
In the Preamble to the Rio Treaty there appears this state-
ment:
Considering:
That the obligation of mutual assistance and common defense of the
American Republics is essentially related to their democratic ideals
and to their will to cooperate permanently in the fulfillment of the
principles and purposes of a policy of peace;
That the American regional community affirms as a manifest truth
that juridical organization is a necessary prerequisite of security and
peace, and that peace is founded on justice and moral order and, con-
sequently, on the international recognition and protection of human
rights and freedoms, on the indispensable well-being of the people, and
on the effectiveness of democracy for the international realization of
justice and security ....
If there is no importance to be attached to the location of a
statement in a treaty, the sole fact of importance being whether
or not the words used are legally obligatory, one arrives at the
same conclusion arrived at under the Charter of Bogota. "Con-
sidering that the obligation of mutual assistance is related to demo-
cratic ideals" and "considering that peace is founded on the ef-
fectiveness of democracy" are merely clauses indicating that the
signatories have taken these things into account, and are actually
less forceful than the reaffirmations and confidence expressed in
the Charter of Bogota. They certainly define no legal duty of ei-
ther the members of the organization or the organization itself.
Their sole legal validity consists in their use as evidences of the
basic motivating ideas which the framers had in view.
It follows then that the two fundamental documents of the in-
ter-American system, while giving florid recognition to the ideals
of political democracy, do not back their high phrases by making
internal democracy a legally enforceable rule of inter-American
law. Both of these documents stress the fact that it is not the in-
ternal government of a nation, but rather the international situa-
43. On the OAS and its constitutional background, see THoMAs &
THOMAS, op. cit. supra note 7, at 114.
44. The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance is set forth in
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 3016; INTER-AMERICAN CONFERENCE FOR
THE MAINTENANCE OF CONTINENTAL PEACE AND SECURITY 59-65 (1958).
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tion created by the acts of a government (whatever type that gov-
ernment might be) that is important to the peaceful development
of the inter-American community. In other words, there exists in
these treaties no right of collective intervention for democracy per
se. But should a nation have an internal government which creates
an international problem threatening the independence, sover-
eignty, inviolability or the integrity of the territory of any Ameri-
can state, methods have been established by treaties to remedy the
situation. The paramount and primary purpose of the OAS is the
maintenance of hemispheric peace. The realization of political
democracy within each nation is apparently left up to the people
of each nation.
II. HUMAN RIGHTS
As mentioned earlier, political democracy is but one aspect of
democracy. One can, to some extent, distinguish between democ-
racy in a political sense and democracy in a human sense, al-
though it must be admitted that these different aspects of the
word are mutually connective by a derivative relation. True politi-
cal democracy is the result of political maturity which is the out-
growth of long development of aspirations and hopes of human
betterment. Advancing human rights and fundamental freedoms
are part of the process of growth toward political maturity.
In the long slow development of international law, human rights
have traditionally been the concern of the individual state. Each
state recognized rights for its citizens or withheld rights from them
according to its own concepts, and no state could justifiably criti-
cize the internal behavior of its neighbors.45 But in the inter-Amer-
ican system, there was an early recognition that a minimum of
human rights should be of international concern. Bolivar's pro-
posed Treaty of Union, League .and Perpetual Confederation,
discussed at the Congress of Panama in 1826, sought to establish
a continental, international citizenship and in addition called upon
all signatories to abolish slavery.46 This was a far cry from any
extensive concept of individual human rights in all the countries
of the hemisphere as a problem deserving international legal pro-
tection, and even this minimum failed to be adopted. In the years
that followed, while political democracy or the more nebulous
45. Green, General Principles of Law and Human Rights, 8 CURRENT
LEoAL PROBLEMS 162 (1955).
46. Arts. 24, 25 & 27 of the Treaty as contained in CARNEOIE EiNDow-
MENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, op. cit. supra note 9, at xxviii.
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idealisms of democracy were vocally stressed at inter-American
gatherings, human rights as such were virtually ignored.
Only since World War II has there been an admission in the
Western Hemisphere that human rights are a subject of interna-
tional concern, that "governments which systematically disregard
the rights of their own people are not likely to respect the rights
of other nations and other people and are likely to seek their ob-
jectives by coercion and force in the international field."4 Sev-
eral resolutions of the 1945 Conference held in Mexico City dealt
with human rights, notably Resolution XL on International Pro-
tection of the Essential Rights of Man which proclaimed the ad-
herence of the American republics to the principles established by
international law for safeguarding the essential rights of man and
declared support of a system of international protection of these
rights." Apparently the resolution was not aimed at the fact that
violation of human rights was to be accepted as a breach of inter-
national law or even that such violation might constitute a threat
to hemispheric peace, but rather was adopted "to eliminate the
misuse of diplomatic protection of citizens abroad."49 The in-
alienable rights of man were still considered subordinate to prin-
ciples of state sovereignty and nonintervention.
At the Rio Conference of 1947, partisans of human rights in-
troduced into the preamble of the Inter-American Treaty of Re-
ciprocal Assistance an idealistic (but nonlegal) statement that:
The American regional community affirms as a manifest truth . . .
that peace is founded on justice and moral order, and consequently,
on the international recognition and protection of human rights and
freedom ....
When the Ninth International Conference of American States met
the following year in Bogota, there was a strong movement to in-
corporate into the Charter of the Organization of American States
a legal obligation binding each nation to respect human rights and
fundamental freedoms with a concomitant duty placed on the OAS
to see that each nation lived up to its obligations in this respect.50
Those opposing argued5' that the Charter was to be in the na-
47. Marshall, No Compromise on Essential Freedoms, 19 DEP'T STATE
BULL. 432 (1948).
48. Resumes of these resolutions may be found PAN AMERICAN UNION,
MANUAL OF INTER-AMERiCAN RELATIONS, Op. cit. supra note 25, at 113-14.
49. RESOLUTIONS XL, PAN AMERICAN UNION, INTER-AMERICAN CON-
FERENCE ON PROBLEMS OF WAR AND PEACE, op. cit. supra note 33, at 69.
50. PAN AMERICAN UNION, INTER-AMERICAN JUDICIAL COMMITTEE RE.
PORT TO THE INTER-AMERICAN COUNCIL OF JURISTS CONCERNING REsoLu-
TION )= OF THE CONFERENCE OF BOGOTA 2 (1949).
51. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 3263, op. cit. supra note 17, at 13.
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ture of a constitutional instrument and should be confined to pro-
visions establishing the OAS, defining the nature, function and re-
lationship of its organs, and all other policies of the inter-Ameri-
can system should be set up in separate agreements. For the most
part this viewpoint prevailed, and the Charter generalizes about
the legal duty to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms.
The preamble declares that "the true significance of American
solidarity and good neighborliness can only mean the consolida-
tion on this continent . . . of a system of individual liberty and
social justice based on respect for the essential rights of man."
The preamble also incorporates statements relating to the encour-
agement and promotion of respect for human rights and funda-
mental freedoms appearing in the Charter of the United Nations
by a declaration that the signatories solemnly reaffirm the princi-
ples and purposes of the United Nations. And in Article 5(j) of
the Charter of the OAS it is stated:
the American States proclaim the fundamental rights of the individ-
ual without distinction as to race, nationality, creed or sex.
As none of these declarations were expressed in terms of a binding
legal obligation, their sole utility was to leave open the way for
further inter-American legislation by treaty in this field. However,
Article 13 of the Charter of Bogota observes:
Each state has the right to develop its cultural, political and economic
life freely and naturally. In this free development, the state shall re-
spect the rights of the individual and the principles of universal morality.
It can be demonstrated that the final sentence of Article 13 es-
tablishes a legal duty on the part of states. Grammatically speak-
ing, "shall," when used in the third person, expresses an obliga-
tion, a command. If the authors of Article 13 desired to express
simple futurity, the article would have read "the state will .... .
The word "shall" is here equivalent to the word "must." It is im-
perative not merely directory. Consequently Article 13 can be in-
terpreted to declare that each state has a legal right to develop
its own way of existence but in so doing it has the legal duty to
respect the rights of individuals. But even if this interpretation is
granted, neither individual states nor the Organization of Ameri-
can States is given the right to take enforcement action to estab-
lish human rights in a state which fails in its obligation. Only if a
violation of these values results in a threat to the peace of the
hemisphere could collective intervention be undertaken under
the terms of the Rio Treaty.52
52. See Rio Treaty Art. 6, supra note 44.
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But those nations seeking to give international protection to
human rights in the Western Hemisphere were not satisfied with
these statements and demanded more. So a further action was tak-
en at the Ninth Conference, the adoption of a resolution known
as the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man.53
This Declaration constitutes the first comprehensive inter-govern-
mental statement of human rights in the history of the hemis-
phere. While it was nothing more than a statement of aims and
hopes and was not intended to be legally binding, it had educa-
tional and inspirational value. It was a source of new hope to those
people throughout the continent working to assure international
legal protection to human rights. It symbolized the deep concern of
many statesmen over defining these rights and establishing an
acknowledgement of the fact that there was a connection between
their denial and acts of aggression against other nations, thus con-
stituting a continual threat to hemisphere peace.
The list of rights to which the inter-American system would
seek to give international protection are of a great variety. First
there are certain rights which may be described as inalienable and
fundamental-inalienable because there are no circumstances in
which a nation could justify a denial of them, and fundamental
because a persistent denial of them will undermine and finally de-
stroy any community based on democratic precepts.54 An order-
ed society, dedicated to the goals which democracy has set, really
should not confer such rights on the individual, it should presup-
pose them. Into this class would fall:
The right to life, liberty and personal security (art. 1)
The right to equality before the law (art. 2)
The right to religious freedom and worship (art. 3)
The right to freedom of investigation, opinion, expression and
dissemination (art. 4)
The right to the inviolability and transmission of correspond-
ence (art. 10)
The right to recognition of juridical personality and of basic
civilrights (art. 17)
The right to a fair trial (art. 18)
The right to nationality (art. 19)
The right to vote and to participate in government (art. 20)
53. FINAL ACT, RES. XXX, as contained in U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB.
No. 3263, op. cit. supra note 17, at 260-66.
54. DE VlsscHER, THEORY AND REALITY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
122-29 (1957); LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HuMAN RIaHTs
123-26 (1950); Fenwick, Pan American Action for the Protection of Hu-
man Rights, 243 ANNALS 149 (1946).
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The right of assembly (art. 21 )
The right of association (art. 22)
The right of petition (art. 24)
The right to protection from arbitrary arrest (art. 25)
The right to due process of law (art. 26)
These rights can all be classified as the basic political rights
which underlie the political aspects of democracy. They are the
important personal and civil rights which make it clear that the
people are the master in a democratic state and the sovereign the
servant. They set the bounds of political authority and reserve to
the individual those areas of individual differences necessary for
the operation of popular government and political democracy. One
other political right is listed, namely the right of every person in
the case of pursuit not resulting from ordinary crimes to seek and
receive asylum in foreign territory (art. 27). If all the other politi-
cal rights listed were fully realized in every nation of the Western
Hemisphere, the necessity for such an inter-American right would
fall by the wayside. Under present conditions in Latin America,
its inclusion is a good indication of hard-headed realism which is
as much a part of the Latin American character as wonderful
idealism.
The second group of rights listed in the declaration are derived
from the general economic objectives of a democratic commu-
nity:
The right to education and equality of opportunity (art. 12)
The right to work and to fair remuneration (art. 14)
The right to leisure time and to the use thereof (art. 15)
The right to social security (art. 16)
The right to private property (art. 23)
In the nineteenth century the emphasis of western democracy
was placed on the political aspects of democracy, but in the twen-
tieth century this emphasis has shifted to the economics of democ-
racy. While many nations of the Western Hemisphere have achiev-
ed some measure of political democracy, many of them are in dire
need of a far fuller measure of economic democracy. Economic
democracy implies something in the nature of an economic or-
der which has in view a leveling of economic privilege and econom-
ic inequalities to the advantage of the underprivileged sections of
the population.5 The ideal of economic equality is a matter of
approximation and not absolutes, but democracy cannot survive
unless political democracy demonstrably yields economic better-
55. THOMAS, EQUALiTY 79 (1949); Wright, Human Rights and the
World Order, 389 INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION 238 (1943).
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ment for the majority of the population. All historical experience
shows that a people without hope of prosperity or a rough equality
of opportunity will fall into the pit of tyranny. In a society with
deep seated sources of economic discontent, extremism cannot be
overcome simply by invoking the superior values of political de-
mocracy. Nevertheless economic equality is no panacea in itself.
It is void of democratic content apart from its coefficient of politi-
cal democracy or the ethical aspirations of democracy. Thus the
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man places
important emphasis on the economic objectives, which are in most
nations merely goals to be achieved and not legally enforceable
rights which have been actually attained internally.
The final group of rights listed in the declaration can roughly
be classified as some of the ethical aspirations underlying any
democratic system. These include:
The right to protection of honor, personal reputation, and pri-
vate and family life (art. 5)
The right to a family and to the protection thereof (art. 6)
The right to protection for mothers and children (art. 7)
The right to residence and movement (art. 8)
The right to the preservation of health and to well being (art.
11)
The right to the benefits of culture (art. 13)
These ethical aspirations indicate the belief that democracy as a
political legal technique is not enough. If the leading ideas of
mankind are not to languish they must show their power to realize
the masses' obscure urge for a better ordained social order, greater
happiness, and a fuller life for the common man. The immediate
importance of these rights are less of achievement than intent.
Their ideal has force, particularly in Latin America. Citizens of the
United States tend to pay less attention to theory than to practice,
but to Latin Americans, no matter how far practice falls short of
high aims, these aims remain a living standard and no less a living
reproach to those who violate them. Thus the American Declara-
tion of the Rights and Duties of Man indicates an inter-American
recognition of the fact that democracy must take place not only
on the legal or political field, but also in the economic and ethical
fields. The struggle must advance on all fronts at the same time
for all these areas are intimately interconnected.
The chapter on rights is closed by an article of general limita-
tion:
The rights of man are limited by the rights of others, by the security
of all, and by the just demands of the general welfare and the advance-
ment of democracy.
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This statement is a recognition of the fact that the fights of
man arise because individuals live in communities, and in an or-
dered society they are protected by that society, but their rights are
subject to qualifications and even restrictions where the interests
of the community so require. The principle underlying such re-
strictions seems to be that each individual shall, so far as it is
practicable, have an equal enjoyment of his rights and freedoms
with every other individual in the community. This equality can
perhaps never be fully attained, but it is the measure by which
the rights and freedoms of each are limited for the benefit of all.
As its title indicates, the Declaration also concerns itself with
the "duties" of man. In the preamble it is stated:
The fulfillment of duty by each individual is a prerequisite to the
rights of all. Rights and duties are interrelated in every social and
political activity of man.
The duties of the declaration can be classified roughly into so-
cial duties, political duties and economic duties. Under the social
duties fall the duties to society (art. 29); duties toward children
and parents (art. 30); duty to acquire an education (art. 31); duty
to serve the community and the nation (art. 34); duty to cooperate
with the state with respect to social security and welfare (art. 35).
The two economic duties set forth are the duty to pay taxes (art.
36) and the duty to work (art. 37). The political duties listed
are the duty to vote (art. 32); the duty to obey the law (art. 33);
and the duty to refrain from political activities in a foreign coun-
try (art. 38).
The underlying idea of including these duties is that each in-
dividual should recognize that he has certain responsibilities to the
society in which he lives, and therefore, the stress should not be
placed solely upon the responsibility of the state to secure human
rights. Nevertheless, one may question the utility of including such
a concept in an international document, for the whole basic theory
of the protection of human rights on the international level is that
the individual can be easily overwhelmed by the aggregate collec-
tion of power lodged in a state. On the other hand a sovereign
state still retains its power to exact from all individuals the duties
which are owed to it.
Furthermore, as the human rights and the duties of man are
placed on equal footing in the Declaration, a state denying human
rights might well plead that the denial was brought about by
failure of the individual or individuals to fulfill the duties which
are set forth in the Declaration. Consequently, if the Organization
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of American States ever attempted to protect the rights of man on
an international level it could well be frustrated.56 The inclusion
of the duties of man in the Declaration can be labelled a confu-
sion of values. Without doubt the duties listed are some of the
major social, political and economic obligations owed by the
citizen to his political community. But each nation is still capable
of exacting such duties from its citizens without invoking the au-
thority of the whole international legal community.
There was one further action taken at Bogota with relation to
human rights-a resolution recommending that the Inter-Ameri-
can Juridical Committee prepare a draft statute providing for the
creation and functioning of an Inter-American Court to guarantee
the rights of man.57 This draft was to be presented at the Tenth
Conference of American States "if it felt that the moment had
arrived for comment thereon."
The Inter-American Juridical Committee, which is the perma-
nent committee of the Inter-American Council of Jurists, presented
to the Council of Jurists, at their first meeting in May 1950, their
unanimous opinion that it would be impossible to create such a
statute at this time.58 The Committee therefore suggested that
the Council inform the Tenth Conference that until such time as
a formal convention on human rights governing the inter-Ameri-
can system had come into being, it would be premature to estab-
lish enforcement procedures. Hence, the Tenth Conference merely
adopted a resolution59 reaffirming that each nation should
strengthen its system for the protection of human rights. Another
resolution was adopted requesting the Council of the OAS to con-
tinue its studies on the juridical aspects of protection of human
rights in order that the matter might be considered at the Eleventh
Inter-American Conference.
While the inter-American system has not as yet constituted legal
norms from which human rights can be derived under positive law,
it certainly must be acknowledged that the Rio Treaty, the Charter
of Bogota and the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties
of man have expanded the problem of human rights from the na-
tional to the international level by the assertions in all of these in-
56. Accioly, Principes Generaux de La Responsabilite Internationale
d'apres La Doctrine et La Jurisprudence, 96 REcuEIL DES CoURs 353, 356(1959).
57. FINAL ACT, RES. XXXI, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 3263,
op. cit. supra note 17, at 266.
58. PAN AMERICAN UNION, INTR-AMERICAN COUNCI OF JURISTS,
INTER-AMERiCAN COURT TO PROTECT THE RIGHTS OF MAN 2 (1953).
59. FINAL ACT, REs. XXVII, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 5692,
101-03 (1954).
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struments that the observance of human rights is now a matter of
international concern. Thus there is a partial recognition that some
aspects of democracy are of hemispheric rather than purely na-
tional import and significance.
I. DEMOCRACY AND THE RIO TREATY
Even though there has been an apparent unwillingness to adopt
binding legal obligations that each nation in the hemisphere shall
become a democracy both in the sense of political democracy and
in the sense of human democracy, the inter-American community
has, nevertheless, been faced with concrete issues where certain of
the American states have sought to impose democracy on neigh-
boring states.
Under Article 6 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal
Assistance of 1947, when there is an act or threat of aggression
which is not an armed attack on a nation of the hemisphere or in
which there may be "any other fact or situation that might en-
danger the peace of the Americas" and that affects the inviolabil-
ity, territorial integrity, sovereignty or political independence of an
American state, the organ of consultation of the inter-American
system is required to meet immediately. They must agree on meas-
ures which, in case of aggression, are to be taken to assist the vic-
tim, or in any case, measures which should be taken for the com-
mon defense for the maintenance of the peace and security of the
continent. The Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign
Affairs was designated as the Organ of Consultation under the Rio
Treaty with powers to decide upon the measures to be taken in
the field of security whenever a particular case should arise. The
Council of the OAS was named as Provisional Organ of Consulta-
tion.60
Hardly had the ink dried on this document before the OAS was
called upon to use the powers granted thereunder to resolve prob-
lems relating to freedom and order in the Caribbean-Central
American area. In 1948 the Council of the OAS, as Provisional
Organ of Consultation, was faced with a case involving Costa Rica
and Nicaragua. And in 1949 and 1950 two additional cases, which
were in reality the same case, arose involving Haiti, the Dominican
Republic, Cuba and Guatemala.61 The agitations which gave rise
60. For a discussion of the Rio Treaty's Article 6 and the measures to
be taken see Thomas & Thomas, The Organization of American States and
Collective Security, 13 Sw. L.J. 177, 196-202 (1959).
61. These cases may be found in PAN AMERIcAN UNION LEGAL DIv.,
APPLICATIONS Or THE INTER-AMmucAN TREATY oF RECIPROCAL ASSIST-
ANcE 1948-1956 at 19-148 (1957).
19611 OAS
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
to these cases were concerned with political antagonisms between
authoritarian governments on the one hand and democratic re-
gimes (or regimes with some democratic tendencies) on the other,
and involved the shadowy organization known as the Caribbean
Legion, dedicated to the overthrow of dictatorships. Designated as
first targets were the dictatorships of Somoza of Nicaragua and
Trujillo of the Dominican Republic.62 The Caribbean Legion
was composed of a strange assortment of mercenaries, adventurers
and patriots in political exile. The latter were "battling for their
ideals" and hoping to restore democratic government in their var-
ious countries, while the former were "taking advantage of that
struggle for selfish purposes. 63 The Legion was more or less
sponsored by Costa Rica, Guatemala and Cuba, which permitted
their territories to be used for revolutionary activities such as
Legion efforts to organize expeditions and fighting forces for in-
vasion, as well as permitting illegal activities as regards traffic in
arms and passage of planes. In retaliation, the Nicaraguan and
Dominican governments aided and abetted revolutionary move-
ments and subversive activities aimed at overthrowing the govern-
ments of Costa Rica, Guatemala and Cuba. As a result of such ac-
tivities turmoil and discord existed in the relations of these con-
tending governments which was to erupt in armed invasions by
revolutionary groups bent on the overthrow of existing regimes;
and conspiratorial plots fomented trouble in democracies as well
as dictatorships.
The OAS pointed out that the right of a people to maintain
within their own territory a government of their own choosing so
long as such action does not endanger other states or the peace of
the Americas has long been an established principle of inter-
American relations. Further, the OAS has no power to intervene
either on behalf of a government or on behalf of internal forces
seeking to overthrow that government. But when a foreign nation
goes to the aid of rebel forces seeking such an overthrowal, the
issue is no longer an internal domestic question, but a controversy
between two states which falls under Article 6 of the Rio Treaty.64
In each of the cases, the prompt action of the OAS averted fur-
62. An excellent and detailed discussion of these cases and OAS action
with reference thereto may be found in Furniss, The Inter-American System
and Recent Caribbean Disputes, 4 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 585
(1950).
63. PAN AMERICAN UNION LEGAL Div. REPORT OF THE INVESTIGATING
COMMITTEE OF THE ORGAN OF CONSULTATION RELATIVE TO THE PETITION
OF THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, op. cit. supra note 61, at 120-21.
64. See, e.g., the resolution of the Council acting provisionally as Organ
of Consultation in the second Haiti-Dominican Republic case. Id. at 128.
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ther activities, and resulted in the signing of Pacts of Amity by the
contending governments. The Council was adamant in condemn-
ing both the democracies and the dictatorships for their interven-
tion. While the OAS acknowledged that representative democracy
and participation in government were fundamental to the inter-
American system, nevertheless, it declared that endorsement of
such principles did not in any way or under any concept authorize
any government or group of governments to violate the inter-
American commitments relative to the principle of non-interven-
tion. By so doing, the Council of the OAS tacitly admitted that in
concrete tests between democracy and human rights versus non-
intervention, the latter duty rules supreme.65
These initial cases confronting the OAS concerned a conflict be-
tween democracy and homegrown American dictatorships. But
soon a different type of situation arose. International communism,
which breeds on chaos and discontent, was not long delayed in
taking advantage of the situations in Central America. By 1954,
Guatemala had become of concern to the inter-American com-
munity as it became apparent that there was an increasing inter-
vention in its government by the international communist move-
ment.66
At the Tenth Inter-American Conference held at Caracas in
1954 the United States called the attention of the other nations of
the continent to the fact that should any nation fall completely
into the hands of the communists such nation would of necessity
be a satellite of the U.S.S.R. and would constitute a serious menace
to the peace of the Americas. The Tenth Conference adopted a
Declaration of Solidarity for the Preservation of the Polical Integ-
rity of the American States against the Intervention of International
Communism which stated that domination or control of the
political institutions of any American state by the international
communist movement would constitute a threat to the sovereignty
and political independence of the American states. This would en-
danger the peace of America and would require a Meeting of Con-
sultation to consider the adoption of appropriate action in accord-
ance with existing treaties. 7 This language in effect interprets
Article 6 of the Rio Treaty in such a way that domination of the
government of an American state by international communism
requires the application of collective measures for the common
65. Ibid.
66. On the Guatemalan Affair see Taylor, The Guatemalan Affair: A
Critique of U.S. Foreign Policy, 50 AM. POL. ScI. REv. 787 (1956).
67. FrNAL ACT, RES. XCIII, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 5692, op.
cit. supra note 59, at 156-57. For a short discussion of the U.S. position
see id. at 7-9.
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defense and the maintenance of the peace and security of the
hemisphere. In other words, in the conflict between non-hemis-
pheric totalitarianism and democracy, there is a possibility that col-
lective intervention could be taken to protect the inter-American
ideals of democracy and human rights against the recognized dan-
gers of the international communist movement which neither
acknowledges nor accepts such principles. In the case of Guate-
mala, the communist issue was resolved by the overthrowal of the
communist oriented government by Guatemalan rebels who in-
vaded from, and with the help of, neighboring countries.
From 1954 to 1959, the tide for democracy began to swell in
Latin America, and dictator after dictator was overthrown. How-
ever, the struggle between dictatorial and anti-dictatorial factions
again spilled outside national borders and into the international
arena and again created situations of extreme danger to hemispheric
peace. This became very apparent after the dictator Batista de-
parted from Cuba and left the stage to the revolutionary move-
ment of Fidel Castro. Castro, picturing himself as another Bolivar,
announced that his revolution, Fidelismo, was not only a fight to
liberate Cuba from the tyranny of Batista, but was a product for
export to help overthrow tyrants wherever they could be found.
With such encouragement, Cuba became the headquarters for
the preparation and launching of revolutionary expeditions by
Latin American political exiles aided by Cuban authorities. With
the ever increasing orientation of the Cuba revolution toward the
Moscow-Peiping Axis, such activities were alarming not only be-
cause they breached the inter-American international agreements
on non-intervention, but also because they were abetted and en-
couraged by a foreign non-hemispheric power. With Fidelismo
as the front, anti-yankeeism as the rallying cry, and communism
as the directing force, an increasing and continued threat exists
for many established governments of Latin America.6 s And Fi-
delismo seeks the overthrowal of democracies as well as dictator-
ships. Within the space of the first six months of 1959, the govern-
ments of Panama, Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic appear-
ed before the Council of the OAS officially charging invasions by
exiles and others attempting to overthrow their governments. In
each case Cuba was implicated, and in the case of the Dominican
charges, Venezuela was also accused of aiding the conspirators. 9
68. On the impact of the Cuban revolution see Benton, The Communist
Threat at Our Back Door, N.Y. Times, July 17, 1960, § 6 (Magazine),
p. 10; Szulc, Castro Tries to Export Fidelismo, id., Nov. 27, 1960 § 6
(Magazine), p. 19.
69. These cases and Council consideration thereof are set forth in PAN
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In the Panamanian (which was a democracy) and Nicaraguan
(which was a dictatorship) cases, the Council followed the usual
procedure of convoking itself as Provisional Organ of Consulta-
tion under the terms of the Rio treaty and sent out investigating
committees to attempt to settle the matter.71 In the Dominican
case, however, the pressures were such that the Council was un-
able to act under the Rio Treaty because the governments of
Cuba and Venezuela opposed its application and announced that
they would permit no OAS investigation to be carried out in their
territory.7' Other governments of Latin American were also uneasy
at any manifestation of support for the dictatorial regime of the
Dominican Republic or at any suggestion of censure of attempts
to overthrow that government, for most of the democracies of Latin
America longed for the downfall of the Trujillo regime, who held
power longer than any other dictator on the globe until his assassi-
nation in 1961.
Action was required, however, as the inter-American system had
taken the stand that non-intervention was superior to the assur-
ance of democracy in every nation. A compromise therefore was
found. Instead of convening the Foreign Ministers as Organ of
Consultation or the Council as Provisional Organ of Consultation
which might have necessitated enforcement measures against the
aggressors under the Rio Treaty, the Council resorted to Articles
39 and 40 of the Charter of Bogota which permits a Meeting of
Foreign Ministers to consider problems of urgent and common
interest to the American states. Under these provisions the Foreign
Ministers have power only to consider sanctions not to take them.
Thus a meeting of Foreign Ministers was called to consider the
whole problem of tensions in the Caribbean area with a view to
the restoration of peace and security, confidence and friendly re-
lations among the republics of the region by cooperation through
the OAS. Two main problems, political unrest in the Caribbean
and effective exercise of representative democracy in the hemis-
phere, were to be considered. Issues emanating from these two
problems were non-intervention, political democracy, human
rights, and the relation of economic development to political sta-
bility. Actually the essential problem of the Fifth Meeting of Con-
sultation when it convened in Santiago oil August 12, 1959, was to
reconcile the growing demand for democratic progress and social
AMERICAN UNION, APLICATIONES DEL TRATADO INTERAMERICANO DE
ASiSTENCIA RECIPROCA 1948-1960, at 259.
70. Id. at 301, 346.
71. Id. at 387-90. See also STEBBINS, THE UNITED STATES IN WORLD
AFFAIRs 352-56 (1959).
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
change in Latin America, and particularly in the Caribbean, with
the traditional inter-American principles of non-intervention in in-
ternal affairs and peaceful relations. Opinions as to how these two
requirements should be reconciled differed widely.72
Cuba and Venezuela called upon the hemispheric democracies to
band together in condemnation of all dictatorships and specifically
that of the Dominican government. The Venezuelan Foreign Min-
ister took the position that only democratic governments should be
admitted to the OAS. A democratic country was defined as one
with freedom of the press, periodic changes of government by
peaceful means, and effective suffrage. The argument that democ-
racy could not be imposed on a nation by outside forces was re-
futed, and a demand for collective action was made to end dicta-
torial abuse of democracy and human rights. It was stated that
such collective action could not be equated with intervention.73
The overwhelming majority of American governments rejected
the Cuban and Venezuelan thesis, re-endorsed the principle of non-
intervention, and rejected the notion that collective action should
be permitted to overthrow Latin American dictatorships. Again the
Latin Americans indicated that dictatorships, no matter how de-
plorable they might be, were to be preferred over any action which
might lessen the effectiveness of internal sovereignty. Nevertheless,
the meeting at Santiago again went on to give extensive expres-
sions of support for democracy, and respect for human rights. A
declaration was adopted, known as the Declaration of Santiago,
which announced in its preamble that it was
the general aspiration of the American peoples to live in peace under
the protection of democratic institutions, free from all intervention
and all totalitarian influence.7 4
The Declaration reaffirmed that there was a relationship between
respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms, and the effective
exercise of representative democracy on the one hand and inter-
American peace and harmony on the other. It noted that failure
to adhere to the principles of democracy is "a source of wide-
spread disturbance and gives rise to emigration that causes frequent
72. On the background of the Santiago Meeting see 41 DEP'T STATE
BULL. 299-306 (1959); N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1959, p. 1, col. 7.
73. Id., Aug. 16, 1959, § 1, p. 7, col. 1. For a summation of the ideas
of the Foreign Minister of Venezuela at the Meeting see Compton, What
About Intervention?, Americas, Nov. 1959, pp. 3, 6.
74. The Declaration of Santiago is set forth in 41 DEP'T STATE BULL.
342-43 (1959).
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and grave political tensions between the state the emigres leave
and the states that receive them. '75
The Declaration went beyond former inter-American pronounce-
ments in favor of democracy in that it listed in a detailed manner
the usual attributes of a democratic system. The purpose of the
list was to permit national and international public opinion to judge
whether or not a particular regime measures up to democratic
standards. Such an announcement, it was stated, would help to
eradicate "forms of dictatorship, despotism, or tyranny." An
amendment to this statement cautiously concluded: "without weak-
ening respect for the rights of peoples freely to choose their own
form of government."
The attributes of a democratic regime were set forth as follows:
1. The principle of the rule of law should be assured by the separation
of powers, and by the control of the legality of governmental acts by
competent organs of the state.
2. The governments of the American republics should be derived
from free elections.
3. Perpetuation in power, or the exercise of power without a fixed
term and with the manifest intent of perpetuation, is incompatible
with the effective exercise of democracy.
4. The governments of the American states should ensure a system
of freedom for the individual and social justice based on respect for
fundamental human rights.
5. The human rights incorporated into the legislation of the various
American states should be protected by effective judicial procedures.
6. The systematic use of political proscription is contrary to American
democratic order.
7. Freedom of the press, of radio and television, and, in general,
freedom of information and expression, are essential conditions for the
existence of a democratic regime.
8. The American states, in order to strengthen democratic institu-
tions, should cooperate among themselves within the limits of their
resources and the framework of their laws so as to strengthen and
develop their economic structure, and achieve just and humane living
conditions for their people.76
This Declaration of Santiago was an admission by the inter-
American system that the hitherto vague statements of principles
relating to democracy did little to provide a clear ground for dis-
tinguishing democracy from alternative political schemes. The mo-
ment had arrived, intellectually as well as practically, when the
statesmen of the Americas were willing to take one more step-
possibly small and faltering-toward their professed goal by
75. Ibid.
76. Ibid.
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establishing a more definite description of the nature of that goal.
At the Santiago meeting the Foreign Ministers also expanded the
powers of the Inter-American Peace Committee, an agency com-
posed of representatives of five American nations which had pre-
viously been granted the duty of keeping vigilance to insure the
prompt settlement of disputes between American republics. The
Committee was given power to suggest measures for the peaceful
settlement of such disputes, although such suggested measures
were in no wise legally binding on the disputants or on the OAS.'
Under its new mandate the Peace Committee was entrusted with
the examination of:
1. Methods and procedures to prevent any activities from abroaddesigned to overthrow established governments or provoke instances
of intervention or acts of aggressions;
2. The relationship between violations of human rights or the non-
exercise of representative democracy, on the one hand, and the political
tensions that affect the peace of the hemisphere, on the other; and
3. The relationship between economic underdevelopment and political
instability3 58
In examining these issues the Peace Committee could take action
at the request of governments or on its own initiative although in
either event its activity remained subject to the consent of a state
in the event an investigation had to be carried on within the ter-
ritorial boundaries of that state. Broad studies were to be initiated
immediately and a preliminary report was to be prepared so that
the American governments might formulate their observations
thereon. After taking into account these observations, a definitive
report was to be presented at the forth-coming Eleventh Inter-
American Conference scheduled to meet at Quito, Ecuador.
In spite of the strong reaffirmation of democracy as an inter-
American principle, the results of the Santiago conference did little
to alleviate tensions in the Caribbean and the situation continued
to harass the OAS. In February, 1960, Venezuela charged that the
Trujillo Government was flagrantly violating human rights by
mass political arrests and imprisonment. The Council again was
faced with the problem of the conflict between the principle of
non-intervention and the principle of maintenance of respect for
77. For discussion of the Inter-American Peace Committee see Fen-
wick, The Inter-American Peace Committee, 43 AM. J. INT'L L. 770 (1949);U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 5692 op. cit. supra note 59, at 13-14.
For text of the Statutes of the Committee see PAN AMmUcAN UNION,
STATUTES OF THE INTER-AMERICAN PEACE COMMITTEE (1956).
78. The Resolution of Inter-American Peace Committee is set forth in
41 DEP'T STATE BULL. 343-44 (1959).
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human rights, the crux of the problem being how to conduct an
investigation into Venezuela's allegations without intervening in the
government of the Dominican Republic. The Council agreed to
give the function of investigation to the Inter-American Peace Com-
mittee under the Santiago mandate.79 The Committee's investiga-
tion verified Venezuela's charges. They found the Dominican Re-
public guilty of the denial of freedom of speech and assembly, ar-
bitrary arrest, cruel and inhuman treatment of prisoners, and the
use of intimidation and terror as political weapons. The Com-
mittee's report stressed the fact that international tensions in the
Caribbean area would continue to increase as long as the Domini-
can Republic remained a dictatorship and did not live up to the
ideals of democracy.8" No immediate action was taken by the OAS
and the Caribbean continued to seethe. Castro's Cuba, aligning
itself ever closer with the Commnuist bloc, shouted daily vitupera-
tions at the United States and at many Latin American regimes
including the democracies of Venezuela, Argentina and Costa
Rica. Rattling Russia's missiles, Castro continued an unceasing
campaign of expropriation of the property of American citizens
in Cuba. Although a bitter enemy of the Trujillo regime when he
first came to power, Castro gradually ceased his tirades against
that government, and in turn the Trujillo regime stopped beaming
anti-Castro radio programs to Cuba. It was soon reliably reported
that these two dictators had arrived at some sort of rapprochement,
leaving Trujillo free to concentrate on their now mutual enemy,
President Betancourt of Venezuela.81
The month of July, 1960, was filled with charges and counter
charges. Venezuela requested the OAS Council to call a Meeting of
Foreign Ministers to consider acts of intervention and aggression
by the Dominican Government against Venezuela which had cul-
minated in June with an attempt to assassinate President Betan-
court.82 Meanwhile the United States, heartily sick of Castro's un-
ending vilifications and unceasing animosity against American citi-
zens and property, cut the Cuban sugar quota. 3 In retaliation,
Castro immediately nationalized the remaining property of Ameri-
cans in Cuba. Russia threatened attack on the United States if
Cuba were faced with armed aggression and in addition offered
to purchase, at world market prices, all Cuban sugar refused by the
79. N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1960, p. 1, col. 5; id., Feb. 9, 1960, p. 1, col. 5;
id., Feb. 12, 1960, p. 10, col. 6; id., Feb. 16, 1960, p. 11, col. 1.
80. Id., June 9, 1960, p. 1, col. 1.
81. Id., Jan. 5, 1961, p. 1, col. 3.
82. PAN AMERICAN UNION, APLICACIONES DEL TRATADO INTERAMERI-
CANO DE ASISTENCIA RECIPROCA, op. cit. supra note 69, at 393.
83. N.Y. Times, July 7, 1960, p. 1, col. 8.
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United States. Russia assured Cuba of vast Soviet economic and
moral support, and declared the Monroe Doctrine to be dead. 4
President Eisenhower then retorted that the United States would
not stand by idly and permit the establishment in the Western
Hemisphere of any regime dominated by international commu-
nism." Cuba sought and obtained an emergency hearing of the
Security Council of the United Nations, charging that the United
States was guilty of aggressive acts toward Cuba. At the urging
of Ecuador and Argentina a motion was approved by the Security
Council referring the issue of Cuban-United States relations to
the OAS.86
An emergency session of the Council of the OAS,8  reviewing
the Caribbean problems, decided to call a Foreign Ministers Meet-
ing at San Jose, Costa Rica. This meeting, the Sixth Meeting of
Foreign Ministers, was convened on August 16, 1960.S This was
the first Meeting of Foreign Ministers ever convened as Organ of
Consultation acting under the Rio Treaty, and it was so convened
to take up the Venezuelan charges of aggression by the Dominican
Republic. An investigating committee, which had probed into
Venezuela's charges, indicted the Trujillo regime for complicity in
the attempt against the life of President Betancourt. 9 The pre-
ponderate feeling of the Ministers was that punitive action should
be taken against the Dominican Republic. Hence, for the first time,
the collective measures of the Rio Treaty, as authorized by Articles
6 and 8, were applied. The Organ of Consultation called for an
immediate break in diplomatic relations and for a partial inter-
ruption of economic relations by all the member states. Such
measure was to continue until the Council, by a two-thirds vote,
should decide that the Dominican Government had ceased to con-
stitute a danger to the peace and security of the hemisphere."
This action was taken because the Dominican Republic had en-
gaged in acts of aggression and not because of the nondemo-
cratic aspects of the regime.
However, the United States, feeling strongly that the two (ag-
gression and nondemocracy) were connected, proposed that more
84. Id., July 10, 1960, § 1, p. 1, col. 8.
85. Id., July 10, 1960, § 1, p. 1, col. 5; id., July 13, 1960, p. 1, col. 4.
86. Id., July 12, 1960, p. 1, col. 3; id., July 16, 1960, p. 1, col. 4; id.,
July 18, 1960, p. 1, col. 4; id., July 20, 1960, p. 1, col. 4.
87. Id., July 19, 1960, p. 10, col. 2; id., July 30, 1960, p. 4, col. 1.
88. Id., Aug. 16, 1960, p. 12, col. 7; id., Aug. 21, 1960, § 1, p. 1,
col. 5.
89. Id., Aug. 19, 1960, p. 1, col. 2; id., Aug. 21, 1960, § 1, p. 1, col. 5;
id., Aug. 23, 1960, p. 6, col. 7.
90. 43 DEP'T STATE BULL. 358 (1960).
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should be done and that the OAS action should be linked with
the establishment of democracy in the Dominican Republic. The
United States suggested that in place of the sanctions proposed by
Latin America, the Organization should call upon the Dominican
Republic to accept inter-American supervision of free elections in
that nation after a period of free expression and free assembly.
If the Dominican Government refused to receive such supervision,
strong sanctions should be imposed not as punitive measures for
aggression only but as measures to force the Dominican Govern-
ment to accede to the international organization.91 This then was
a major effort to enforce political democracy and human rights
against a member of the inter-American community violating these
avowed community principles.
This proposal of the United States met with cool reception from
the Latin American nations. Because it was tantamount to setting
up a provisional inter-American political trusteeship over the Do-
minican Republic, most Latin American nations felt this was out-
side the power of the OAS. It smacked of collective interven-
tion.9 2 The Latin American democracies had for years been de-
manding an ouster of the Trujillo regime, but when faced with a
legitimate manner of so doing under inter-American treaties, they
could not bring themselves to the point where they would concede
that democracy was more important than non-intervention. Their
attitude naturally was colored by the hope that the moral impact
of the rupture of relations, the condemnation of the Trujillo govern-
ment, and the partial rupture of economic relations would be suf-
ficient to topple the Trujillo regime. Therefore, the United States
proposal was rejected and sanctions for aggressive acts were im-
posed, the United States agreeing to accept the Latin American
views. Only after this move had been taken did some concern
arise in the minds of Latin American statesmen that if Trujillo
were thus toppled a power vacuum might arise in the Dominican
Republic which immediately could be taken over by a Castro-
Communist government.93
After a delay of twenty-four hours following its deliberation
and action in the Venezuelan-Dominican controversy, the Foreign
Ministers at San Jose turned to the problem of Cuba-United States
relations. The meeting at this point was called the Seventh Meeting
of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and was not held under the Rio
Treaty but was called "to consider problems of an urgent nature
91. Id. at 355-58.
92. N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1960, p. 1, col. 2.
93. Id., Aug. 21, 1960, § 1, p. 1, col. 5.
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and of common interest." 94 From the outset it was clear that many
of the ministers present, although disturbed by the communist pen-
etration of a hemispheric nation and by Cuba's unending war of
propaganda attempting to promote unrest and revolutions through-
out the Americas, were prevented from taking a strong stand be-
cause of the widespread sympathy with Fidelismo among their
own peoples. Many Latin Americans are in deep sympathy with
the Castro revolution for they see in its drastic economic reform
efforts to correct evils which are a part of most of the Latin Ameri-
can scene, i.e., concentration of ownership of land and other forms
of wealth in the hands of a few, poverty of the masses, lack of op-
portunity, and lack of industrialization. As anti-Americanism has
long been a favorite rallying cry for all of Latin America, Castro's
tweaking of the eagle's beak has not been unrelished, and very
few Latin American governments were willing, in face of a wide-
spread internal sympathy for Castro, to risk political overturn by
pro-Castro masses. 95
The Foreign Minister of Columbia was a most cogent speaker
for the Latin American viewpoint. He expressed support for the
aims of the Cuban revolution, and openly declared that if the con-
troversy were between the United States and Cuba solely, the La-
tin Americans would all be on the side of Cuba; but in a conflict
between America and Russia, or between democracy and inter-
national communism, no nation in the hemisphere could remain
neutral.96 The United States Secretary of State, Christian Herter,
pointed out that Sino-Soviet imperialism was exploiting the situa-
tion in Cuba as a means of installing a communist regime there,
which meant not only the loss of that country's independence but
also the establishment of an excellent operational base for com-
munist infiltration and subversion against all other American na-
tions. He pointed out that resistance to such extracontinental in-
tervention was the cornerstone of the inter-American system, and
to permit communist intervention in this hemisphere was to ne-
gate the basic political objectives of the American people-name-
ly the establishment of political democracy and the recognition of
human rights and freedoms.
Taking the Declaration of Santiago as the instrument setting
forth the inter-American concept of what democracy entailed,
Herter listed one by one the violations by Cuba of the principles
enunciated in that document. Cuban suppression of these democrat-
94. Art. 39, Charter of OAS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 3263,
op. cit. supra note 17, at 173.
95. See note 68 supra.
96. N.Y. Times, Aug. 24, 1960, p. 19, col. 3.
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ic freedoms to serve the purposes of an extracontinental power was
no longer a local and internal matter but should be a matter of deep-
est concern to all members of the OAS. The United States therefore
called upon the members of the Organization to condemn com-
munist intervention in inter-American affairs and to indicate grave
concern over Cuba's toleration and encouragement of such inter-
vention. Herter did not seek sanctions against Cuba, but merely a
censure of that nation's government as a warning. 7
Most Latin American delegates were unwilling to go along with
such a strong denunciation of Cuba, again using the doctrine of
non-intervention to thwart any possible actions to aid in the spread
of political democracy. Thus, they indirectly aided an alien ideology
which was seeking to extend its dictatorial system to all of Latin
America. The declaration which did come out of the Seventh
Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs placed the OAS on record
against communist intervention in the Americas, without specifi-
cally naming Cuba, and condemned the attempts by Russia and
Communist China to make use of the political or social situation
of any American state for their own purposes. The document re-
asserted the axiom that the inter-American system was incompati-
ble with any form of totalitarianism."'
While the United States delegates attempted to read into the
resolution a rebuke of Cuba, most Latin American delegates did
not agree. They saw in the resolution a mere appeal to Cuba to
seek protection within the inter-American system rather than within
the communist orbit. The Mexican delegate went so far as to issue
a special statement to the effect that the declaration was general in
character and did not constitute a condemnation or threat against
Cuba. 9
One significant statement in favor of democracy was sent to the
Seventh Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs by President Be-
tancourt of Venezuela.' 0 He called for a declaration or a treaty
to be drawn up at the Eleventh Inter-American Conference which
would oust from the OAS governments not freely elected by the
people of the country. This instrument, he stated, should also stipu-
late that member states were under a duty to respect the funda-
mental rights of man, guarantee freedom of the press and infor-
mation, and recognize the rights of minorities to organize political
97. Statements made by Secretary Herter, 43 DEP'T STATE BULL. 395-
407 (1960).
98. Declaration of San Jose, Costa Rica, id. at 407-08; see also N.Y.
Times, Aug. 27, 1960, p. 4, col. 1; id., Aug. 29, 1960, p. 1, col. 8.
99. Id., Aug. 30, 1960, p. 1, col. 6.
100. Id., Aug. 24, 1960, p. 19, col. 4.
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parties. This plan would involve sanctions, against any state vio-
lating such principles, by isolation and exclusion from the inter-
American community. Betancourt deemed such sanctions as a pro-
tection against dictatorships of the right or of the left.
By January 1961, it had become apparent that the break in dip-
lomatic relations which followed the San Jose meeting and the al-
most universal hostility toward the Dominican Republic had little
apparent effect in weakening Trujillo. The latter continued in
power by ruthless elimination of any possible rivals and by denial
of fundamental rights to his people. In an effort to bring further
pressure on Trujillo, the Council of the Organization of American
States voted to cut off exports of oil and trucks to the Dominican
Republic, although a number of Latin American nations abstained
from voting on this issue, either on the ground of non-intervention
or because they had come to believe such measures were not ef-
fective in view of the cold war realities. 1' 1
CONCLUSION
In summation, what conclusions can be drawn from the pro-
nouncements and practices of the OAS concerning collective ef-
forts to advance democracy in the Western Hemisphere? It should
be apparent that Pan Americanism has placed its major stress
upon the principle that a state must be free to choose any form of
government or political institution it desires. Further, it must be
free to treat its own citizens as it wishes, and no other nation or
group of nations may interfere in this protected sphere. Since the
first stirrings of the movement, democracy has been stressed as an
inter-American goal. In recent years many resolutions and declar-
ations have pledged the American nations to political democracy
and to the protection of human rights. Nevertheless, no firm legal
obligations backed by adequate sanctions have been agreed upon to
assure the growth of democracy throughout the region.
In actual situations involving contests between democracy and
indigenous dictatorships arising before the Organization since
World War II, little comfort can be found in the actions of the
Council of the OAS for those seeking to foster democratic govern-
ments and observance of human rights in the Americas. The
Council has clearly indicated that whatever collective measures
were prescribed, they were taken only for the prevention of the use
of force or threats thereof as international instruments of political
change and were not related to the characteristics of any internal
regime. Collective measures under the Rio Treaty were to be taken
101. Id., Jan. 5, 1961, p. 1, col. 7.
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against any nation menacing or breaching the peace without taking
into consideration the question of whether the delinquent nation
was attempting to foster democracy or totalitarianism. Judging
from the Council's action, non-intervention was to be upheld in
every circumstance under the assumption that the internal form of
government of any state was relatively unimportant to inter-Ameri-
can peace and security. At least, it was not of sufficient signifi-
cance to justify collective measures to assure internal democracy.
This staunch maintenance of the absolute right of internal self-
determination resulted in the immunity of totalitarian dictatorships
from outside pressures for democratic purposes. Yet once the to-
talitarian government obtained a stranglehold upon the people of a
nation, it often embarked upon external aggressive policies that
brought with them international conflict. Immunity from collective
intervention became a tool of those who used democratic rights to
destroy democracy and international law rights to destroy inter-
national law.
While the inter-American system was unwilling to authorize
measures to overthrow indigenous dictatorships, it did to a limited
extent recognize the aggressive nature of international communism
as a threat to the peace of the Americas. By the Declaration of
Caracas it cleared the way for collective measures under the Rio
Treaty against an American state dominated by this type of totali-
tarianism. It should be noted, however, that the loss of democratic
values in an American state absorbed by the international com-
munist movement was not the primary motivating force behind
the Declaration of Caracas. In sponsoring the declaration, the
United States stressed that its concern over communist penetration
in the hemisphere was based on the requirement of hemispheric
security, not on the political color of a national government.
At the behest of the Latin American nations, still over concern-
ed with non-intervention and under concerned with the goals of
democracy, the Declaration of Caracas carefully stated:
This declaration of foreign policy made by the American republics
in relation to dangers originating outside this Hemisphere, is de-
signed to protect and not to impair the inalienable right of each Amer-
ican state freely to choose its own form of government and economic
system and to live its own social and cultural life.102
It was maintained that this clause stipulated that each Latin
American nation is to continue free from the threat of intervention
in the event a local political party should succeed in imposing up-
102. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 5692, op. cit. supra note 59, at
157.
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on the people a "national" (as distinguished from an "interna-
tional") brand of communism.' This view completely ignores
international reality, for a national brand of communism is indeed
uncommon.
At the San Jose meeting in 1960, it was re-emphasized that in-
ternational communism was contrary to the democratic principles
espoused by the Americas and was a threat to hemispheric peace
and security. However, no sanctions were proposed against the
American nation which, if one may judge from substantial evi-
dence, has become linked to the international communist move-
ment. Even the condemnation of Sino-Soviet intervention by those
gathered at San Jose was said by some of the delegates not to be a
condemnation of the particular American nation which had invited
such intervention. Notwithstanding such an attitude, the American
nations, in the Declaration of Caracas, have gone on record that
collective enforcement machinery does exist for action against a
regime dominated by international communism. That the Ameri-
can republics have not had the political fortitude to make use of
it is another matter.
But aside from the non-democratic international communist
movement, which due to its subversive and aggressive nature
constitutes a special threat to the security of the hemisphere, in
reality the collective advancement of democracy has fared poorly
at the hands of the OAS.
A sharp division between the ideal and the real, between official
platitudes and official policy has characterized the relationship be-
tween democracy and hemispheric unity. The nations of the Ameri-
cas have proclaimed the lofty goals of democracy, but they have
remained, for the most part, unwilling or unable to implement
them. Consequently it would seem that all the inter-American dec-
larations and avowals on democracy are but exercises in futility,
frustration and self-deception.
It is easy to condemn such inconsistency as undesirable, unwhole-
some and even immoral. But to do so is to overlook the fact that
to Latin America the importance of such proclamations lies in the
fact that they are anticipatory. That is, they represent the "ought to
be" rather than present reality. In this respect the pronouncements
must not be underestimated. A group of nations which together
has a vision, however hazy, of the path which they wish to travel
together has developed the first essential of a true international
community. When the total inter-American world thus subscribes
103. Irizarry y Puente, The Doctrines of Recognition and Intervention
in Latin America, 28 TUL. L. REv. 313, 341 (1954).
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unhesitatingly to democratic ideals, the prompt achievement may
not be forthcoming, but the dream has some validity.
Man is, after all, an ideological animal. He acts in accordance
with his innermost convictions. Thus when the nations of the
Americas establish, as they did at Santiago in 1959, an excellent
outline of democratic policy which epitomizes the philosophical
and political creed of all the peoples of the Americas, they set
forth a ceiling toward which governments and people should strive.
While the Santiago meeting stopped short of the creation of any
new procedures to secure democracy in nations with despotic
governments, and even re-emphasized absolute non-intervention, it
nevertheless did set up a standard which the spotlight of public
opinion can use to measure violations of democracy. This may alert
the people of a nation and the people of the hemisphere to the
dangers inherent in those governments which fail to measure up.
This appeal to public opinion, even without any threat of other
action may, at some times and under some circumstances, have a
compelling effect on governments. It can do so by either internally
arousing the people to rise up against the regime, or externally
threatening the loss of international respect and prestige or some
other deference value which may be of importance.
The Inter-American Peace Committee in effect appealed to the
censure of public opinion when it investigated and condemned the
flagrant denial of human rights by the Trujillo Government. The
Dominican Government complained bitterly that such investigation
and censure were interventionary in character and in contradiction
to the non-intervention principle even though no enforcement
measures followed at the time. While in this case the power to
study, investigate, recommend and condemn did not have the co-
ercive effect of compelling the Dominican Government to act in
accord with the will of the OAS, it was sufficiently disturbing to
elicit protests from that government.
Of greater significance was the equating by the Inter-Ameri-
can Peace Committee in the Dominican case of a flagrant denial
of human rights and lack of representative democracy by a local
despot with hemispheric tensions and threats to the peace. The
germ of this idea is to be found in the Declaration of Santiago
where it was said:
That harmony among the American republics can be effective only
insofar as human rights and fundamental freedoms and the exercise of
representative democracy are a reality within every one of them, since
experience has demonstrated that failure to adhere to such principles
is a source of widespread disturbance and gives rise to emigration that
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causes frequent and grave political tensions between the state the
emigr6s leave and the states that receive them;
That the existence of anti-democratic regimes constitutes a violation
of the principles on which the Organization of American States is
founded, and endangers the living together in peaceful solidarity in the
hemisphere. 10
It was United States Secretary of State Herter who attempted
to bring the idea to full fruition at the San Jose meeting in 1960.
He did so by showing that hemispheric tensions and threats to the
peace created by denial of human rights and political democracy
would permit the application of coercive measures under the Rio
Treaty against nations such as the Dominican Republic. To sustain
his argument he harked back to the Peace Committee's report
which blamed the aggravation of Caribbean tensions upon the
widespread violations of human rights in the Dominican Republic
and which declared that these tensions would continue and in-
crease so long as such violations persisted. Herter, following the
lead of Kant and Rodriguez Larreta, declared that collective meas-
ures to obtain respect for human rights and the assurance of de-
mocracy were necessary to remove threats of aggression and threats
to the peace.
Latin America again shied away from this theory, preferring to
deal only with the symptoms of the disease and not the disease
itself. They were willing to apply diplomatic and economic sanc-
tions under the Rio Treaty against the Dominican Republic for its
international aggressions, but were unwilling to force the Domini-
can Republic to hold free democratic elections under the control of
the OAS. Presumably some nations believed that such sanctions
for aggressive action would topple the Dominican dictator without
forcing direct action to attain the inter-American goal of democ-
racy. So far this hope has been frustrated. Whether, in the face of
such frustration and in the face of continuing Caribbean tension,
they will continue to limit the OAS actions to improvisations and
sporadic counterpunching, or whether they will eventually be will-
ing to take a long step forward and permit the OAS to give pur-
poseful direction to continental democracy remains to be seen.
In any event, in recent times a path has been dimly lighted
showing that inter-American machinery does exist under the Rio
Treaty for multilateral measures to assure democracy not only
when the democratic principles are violated by international com-
munism, but also when they are violated by an American dictator-
ship unaffected by extra-continental ideology.
104. Declaration of Santiago, supra note 74.
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There is great controversy over the issue of whether collective
measures should be taken for democracy and whether such meas-
ures will always be effective for such a purpose. As of now, the
OAS can act only under the Rio Treaty when totalitarianism be-
comes a threat to hemispheric peace. This may be too late to take
effective action to ensure democracy, for once a dictator is firmly
ensconced in power, with all the modem informational facilities at
his control, he can force his people to uphold their dictatorial re-
gime in a fit of patriotic fervor against interventionary measures
from outside. Another problem is the extent and kind of collective
action that should be taken. The Dominican case has highlighted
the fact that diplomatic and economic isolation may not be suffi-
cient. Nations outside the hemisphere, and even some within it,
have demonstrated that they are quite willing to fill such a vacuum.
Herter's suggestion of requiring the Dominican Government to hold
free democratic elections under the supervision of the OAS could
possibly not have come about without the use of force. Thus it
would seem that reliance on coercion in an area such as this would
mean, in practice, a choice between tacit appeasement so that the
international situation will not be further aggravated, or collective
use of force in order to enforce a principle. By the use of collec-
tive force a dictator probably could be removed, a country paci-
fied, human rights secured and free elections held. But the legal
problem which arises here is that the American nations, either in-
dividually or through collective action under their regional organi-
zation, are prohibited from using armed force by the United Na-
tions Charter except in cases of individual or collective self-de-
fense.105
A further criticism of the use of sanctions or collective meas-
ures to promote or re-establish democracy is the suffering that
may be brought upon the heads of innocent people. This, of
course, must be balanced against the suffering they endure under
the dictatorship. It is axiomatic that once freedom is lost, tyrants
are not to be shaken off again without endless pain.
It is argued that no international organization ought to step in
to redress antidemocratic situations because there is no absolute
definition of democracy which would enable an organization at
all times to judge accurately whether a particular government is
105. Art. 2, Paragraph 4 of the U.N. Charter prohibits the members
from the threat or use of force. Article 51 of the Charter makes an ex-
ception and permits such use in the right of individual or collective self-
defense. Otherwise by the terms of Article 53 regional agencies may take no
enforcement action unless authorized by the Security Council. On the right
of self-defense under the Rio Treaty and the U.N. Charter see Thomas &
Thomas, supra note 60, at 178-202.
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or is not democratic. If the inter-American system were to use all
of the high aims expressed in the American Declaration of the
Rights and Duties of Man as its standard, this argument might be
valid, but the Declaration of Santiago, being more limited and
more realistic, establishes a reasonable standard against which gov-
ernments can be measured. The inter-American system cannot
seek perfection. In trying to secure democracy it cannot demand
the realization of the sum total of the democratic ideal or nothing
else. Rather, it must try to introduce into reality as much of the
ideal as is possible at any given time. It would be manifestly im-
possible to correct every deviation from the goals of democracy in
the Americas. Under present treaties, the OAS is limited to main-
taining continental peace and could only take action in situations
where totalitarianism has created international political tensions.
The Dominican case has shown that such a situation is readily rec-
ognizable.
An entirely separate problem is the feasibility or the possibility
of imposing democracy upon a people from without. If democracy
is foisted upon a people, foreign and unassimilated, as a political
penicillin warranted to cure all social ills, it will fail unless it
manifestly promotes stability and public order. Should democracy
fail, the way is left open for a more compulsive creed such as com-
munism. Democracy grows from decent and capable rulers, a sense
of historical achievement, some geographical security from ex-
ternal aggression, a sense of social responsibility, a minimum of
mutual confidence between the citizens of the state, and reasonable
prosperity. In Latin America, the latter is particularly important,
for without prosperity or hope of prosperity democracy cannot
function. Therefore in Latin America the fate of democratic insti-
tutions is bound up with the continuation of land reform, the inte-
gration of the agricultural classes into the state, economic and so-
cial progress. In a society with deep seated sources of social dis-
content, extremism cannot be overcome simply by invoking the
superior values, moral and political, of democratic government.
They have to be demonstrated by action. History teaches that
ultimate stability is achieved not by attempting to suppress changes
in the established order, but by understanding the underlying
forces and imprinting upon the process itself the outlines of the
desirable outcome. The task of the OAS, therefore, must be more
than just overthrowing a dictator and holding free elections. It
must give purposeful direction to the process of change in a newly
freed nation. New creative solutions must be found if democratic
ideas are effectively to shape the life of this hemisphere. They
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must become dynamic ideas which are given substance. A more
stable continental environment calls for finding ways of influenc-
ing the course of social revolution sweeping Latin America so that
when it has run its course, the nations will not emerge as totali-
tarian but rather as nations where democratic values can flourish
and society prosper. The task for those who cherish freedom is to
develop the capabilities of the Latin American countries for de-
mocracy and to see that the possibility of enjoying their economic
progress in freedom is open to them.
But in the immediate sense, when outrageous denials of demo-
cratic freedom lead to threats and breaches of inter-American
peace, the OAS has a mandate to act. It must utilize all collec-
tive measures to remove the threat to peace caused by antidemo-
cratic regimes, always bearing in mind that care will be required
to steer a proper course between excessive zeal and unjustified
caution. It is to be hoped that the nations of Latin America will
awaken to the fact that the dogma of absolute sovereignty, of non-
intervention, is maintained at an incalculable cost to the well being
of the whole hemisphere. No community can be held together long
unless it has a more positive ideal than the maximum of non-inter-
ference in the affairs of its members. There must be a minimum
of mutual confidence between the nations of the Americas so they
can cooperate freely in seeking democratic goals. The things that
unite the American nations are far greater and more potent than
those that divide them. But the things that unite must become dy-
namic and the unity must be translated into action.
There is no solution or set of solutions that will effectively and
permanently eliminate all oppressive governments from the hemis-
phere. However, if the nations of the Americas are motivated by
good will and guided by reason, they can work out piecemeal
solutions to the problems of oppressive power as these problems
manifest themselves. Through collective action under the OAS they
may be able to enforce some democratic regimes in one country if
not in another. Eventually, if the Americas retain both courage
and respect for democratic rights, democracy may become secure
in all of the nations of the Western Hemisphere. There is no pat-
ented solution to the problem. The OAS can seek only to effect
running adjustments to work out tentative and even imperfect-be-
cause they are experimental-solutions.
It is impossible to predict with certainty whether the immediate
future of the Western Hemisphere lies with democracy or tyranny,
but the fundamental cleavages in the world today cannot be com-
promised or eliminated merely by renewed avowals of dedication
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to the goals and ideals of democracy and human rights. The Amer-
ican nations must bear in mind that proclamations and declara-
tions alone do not create democracy. Democracy is at the cross-
roads, and to survive it must be defended by all the potentials of
the inter-American community. The lofty but unimplemented
statements laid down as hemispheric goals must be backed by the
organized power of the inter-American system or they should no
longer be considered as inter-American principles. By failing to
promote democracy and respect for human rights, by failing to
take definitive action for their defense, by creating a wide discrep-
ancy between professed ideals and a willingness to work for those
ideals, the inter-American system is merely smoothing the way for
anti-democratic alternatives. If democracy is worth defending, it is
worth defending now. The time has come to "suit the action to
the word, the word to the action."1 '
106. SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET Act III, Sc. 2, Line 20.
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